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Abstract 
We examine the relation between disclosure frequency and earnings management, 
and the impact of this relation on post-issue performance, for a sample of seasoned equity 
offerings (SEOs). We contend that firms with extensive disclosure are less likely to face 
information problems, leading to less earnings management and better post-issue 
performance. Our results confirm that disclosure frequency is inversely related to 
earnings management and positively associated with post-issue performance. We also 
find that transparency-reducing disclosure is concentrated in firms that substantially, but 
temporarily, increase disclosure prior to the offering. Such firms exhibit more earnings 
management and poorer post-SEO stock performance, on average.  
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Disclosure frequency and earnings management  
 
 
1.   Introduction 
Recent research suggests that firms issuing equity can inflate their stock price temporarily 
via earnings management prior to the offering. Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a) find that firms 
report income-increasing discretionary accruals before seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and that 
long-run, post-issue operating and return performance is negatively related to earnings 
management. DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004) support the view that some firms 
opportunistically manipulate earnings upward before stock offerings, rendering themselves 
vulnerable to litigation. These studies conclude that market participants fail to adequately adjust 
for earnings management, leading to post-offering stock underperformance.  
Equity-issuing firms can also increase their stock price by reducing their cost of capital 
through voluntary disclosure. Botosan (1997) finds that the cost of capital is negatively associated 
with the level of voluntary disclosure. Most previous studies of disclosure strategies focus on either 
the reduction of the cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Botosan, 1997; Botosan and 
Plumlee, 2002) or the reduction of information asymmetry (Coller and Yohn, 1997; Healy and 
Palepu, 1993, 2001; Schrand and Verrecchia, 2004). Despite the pivotal role that disclosure 
strategies play in the SEO market, the causes and ramifications of SEO firms’ disclosure strategies 
have not received sufficient attention in the literature.  
In this paper, we examine the relation between a firm’s disclosure frequency and earnings 
management, and the impact of this relation on post-issue SEO performance. Casual observation 
suggests that there is wide variation in disclosure strategies. Some firms communicate 
continuously with investors through voluntary disclosure, while others provide very little 
information. Existing research does not explore the possible relation between disclosure 
frequency and earnings management.  
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There is growing evidence that disclosure generally improves transparency and thus 
reduces information problems (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Schrand and Verrecchia, 2004). However, 
it is also possible that managers use particular disclosure strategies to reduce transparency and 
hype their firms’ stocks (Lang and Lundholm, 2000). If information intermediaries (such as 
financial analysts, underwriters, auditors, etc.) are effective, disclosure is more likely to increase 
transparency. As recent accounting scandals indicate, however, these intermediaries face their 
own conflicts of interest, raising questions about their effectiveness. In particular, Lin and 
McNichols (1998) and Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (2000) suggest that analysts affiliated with 
investment banks that underwrite equity issues tend to make higher growth forecasts than 
unaffiliated analysts do, and subsequently have larger forecast errors. 
We argue that, in general, disclosure increases transparency and therefore reduces 
incentives to manage earnings because increased transparency helps investors detect earnings 
management. Greater disclosure frequency exposes earnings management, and accordingly, 
disclosure frequency and earnings management are negatively associated. Similar to Schrand and 
Verrecchia’s (2004) IPO study, we claim that greater disclosure frequency around the SEO period 
helps reduce information asymmetry between managers and investors. This reduction of 
information asymmetry limits any temporary overvaluation of the SEO, reducing post-issue SEO 
underperformance.  
Consistent with our predictions, our earnings management proxy, performance-adjusted 
discretionary total accruals, is inversely associated with disclosure frequency. Our findings are 
robust to excluding income-decreasing accruals and controlling for investment opportunities and 
reportable events. We also find that post-issue SEO performance is positively associated with 
disclosure frequency after controlling for confounding effects, implying that disclosure reduces 
post-SEO underperformance. The results remain qualitatively unchanged using other proxies of 
earnings management, such as the discretionary current accruals that Teoh, Welch, and Wong 
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(1998a, 1998b), Rangan (1998), and DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004) use, and the 
discretionary total accruals that Hribar and Collins (2002) suggest. Different measurement 
windows of accruals and disclosure do not change the result. 
Lang and Lundholm (2000) note that firms wishing to hype their stocks have an incentive 
to increase disclosure immediately before the offer. Such firms also may have an incentive to 
manage their earnings. For a subset of firms, we find evidence consistent with this conjecture. In 
particular, we find that firms with non-persistent increases in disclosure aggressively manage their 
earnings around the time of the offering. The post-issue performance of these firms is particularly 
poor. This subsample supports the hypothesis that firms use transparency-reducing hype to boost 
their SEO price.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our predictions regarding the 
interrelation among disclosure frequency, earnings management, and post-issue performance. 
Section 3 describes the data and measurement. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.   Disclosure frequency, earnings management, and post-issue performance 
A primary incentive for earnings management before stock issues is to increase recently 
reported earnings and cause investors to form overly optimistic expectations regarding the value 
of the firms issuing equity. If buyers accept inflated reported earnings, they could end up paying 
too much for shares. Issuers thus obtain more issue proceeds and lower the cost of capital. Most 
of the prior work on earnings management around equity offers (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998a, 
1998b; DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik, 2004; Kim and Park, 2005) uses this incentive to 
motivate the research. 
However, Rangan (1998) argues that managers also have incentives to manage earnings 
in the quarters following the offering announcement due to legal liabilities and lock-up 
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agreements. First, an immediate earnings reversal after the offering announcement and the 
associated price drop could precipitate lawsuits against the firm and its managers (Skinner, 1994, 
1997). DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004) show that the decline in abnormal working 
capital accruals is more pronounced for firms that are later sued regarding their offers than for 
those that are not sued. Second, firms enter into lock-up agreements with their underwriters that 
prevent insiders at issuing firms from selling their holdings during the 90 to 180 days after the 
offering date (Field and Hanka, 2001). Insiders who wish to sell shares at the end of this lock-up 
period clearly have an incentive to support the firm’s stock price. Therefore, they are likely to 
manage earnings until the end of the lock-up period. Rangan (1998) finds that earnings 
management peaks in the quarters immediately following the offering announcements. Teoh, 
Welch, and Wong (1998b, p. 1939) also argue that incentives to manage earnings are likely to 
persist in the months immediately after an offering. They propose that the lock-up agreements, as 
well as increased legal and reputational scrutiny, help explain why the earnings management 
period extends beyond an offer.  
Recognizing the incentives to manage earnings following offering announcements, we 
measure earnings management over a period that includes the quarters both before and after the 
offering announcement. Results reported in Section 3.4 show that discretionary accruals are 
largest in the quarters after the offering announcement, justifying the use of this measure in the 
cross-sectional tests. We use various accrual measurement windows to examine whether our 
results are sensitive to different measurement windows and to assess when earnings management 
occurs. 
 
2.1.   Transparency-increasing disclosure and earnings management 
Schipper (1989) argues that the absence of full communication (or the existence of blocked 
communication), together with asymmetric information, makes it possible for managers to manage 
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earnings. This implies that earnings management is less likely for firms that disclose more 
information on a persistent basis because the increased transparency lowers information asymmetry 
and helps investors recognize earnings management. Conversely, incentives for earnings 
management are likely to be high for firms with limited disclosure when information asymmetry is 
high. 
 
Prediction 1. Earnings management is a decreasing function of the persistent level of disclosure. 
 
 
2.2. Transparency-increasing disclosure and post-issue SEO performance 
Prior literature reports long-run, post-issue operating and stock market SEO 
underperformance (Loughran and Ritter, 1995, 1997; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995). While 
the effect of information disclosure in reducing information asymmetry in a general setting 
receives significant attention in the literature,1 the impact of information disclosure on the post-
issue performance of SEOs has been relatively ignored.  
We argue that disclosure activities affect post-SEO performance for at least two reasons. 
First, disclosure reduces the information gap between issuers and investors, thereby reducing any 
SEO overvaluation and the subsequent price correction. Second, for firms that manage earnings 
and have limited disclosure in periods leading up to an SEO, there is likely to be an information 
problem that will be accompanied by pre-SEO overvaluation and a corresponding price correction 
when true earnings are revealed in the post-issue period. If earnings are managed but firm 
disclosure is high, then investors are likely to see through the earnings management, leading to 
little overvaluation or post-issue underperformance. In short, transparency-increasing disclosure 
                                                 
1 Healy and Palepu (1993) argue that disclosure reduces information asymmetry between managers and 
investors regarding economic earnings. Lang and Lundholm (1996) suggest that firms with more 
informative disclosure policies have a larger analyst following, more accurate analyst earnings forecasts, 
less dispersion among individual analyst forecasts, and less volatility in forecast revisions. 
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plays a role in reducing SEO overvaluation and post-issue underperformance by reducing 
information problems. 
However, not all disclosure is credible. If disclosure activities decrease immediately 
following the offer, disclosure prior to an SEO could have been used to hype the stock. In 
addition, maintaining a high level of disclosure over an extended period (even after the offering 
date) would be important to holding investor attention. Consequently, we contend that a firm’s 
post-issue SEO performance is related to the disclosure level maintained persistently over the 
periods both prior to and subsequent to the offer. 
 
Prediction 2. Post-issue SEO performance is less negative for firms that maintain a persistently 
high level of disclosure around the offering. 
 
 
2.3. Opaque disclosure and earnings management 
 
While a sustained level of disclosure is associated with the existing level of information 
asymmetry, changes in disclosure could more clearly represent intentions to affect the 
information environment. Lang and Lundholm (2000) hypothesize that firms might increase 
disclosure prior to the offer to “hype” the stock, thereby increasing offer proceeds. 2  In this 
environment, managers also might aggressively manipulate accruals to influence market 
perceptions. If firms intend to provide disclosure that reduces transparency in an attempt to hype 
their stocks, we expect that they are likely to increase disclosure activity substantially prior to the 
offer, but subsequently revert back to low disclosure levels after the offer.  
 
Prediction 3. Earnings management is positively associated with a non-persistent disclosure 
increase.  
 
2.4.   Opaque disclosure and post-issue SEO performance 
                                                 
2 Lang and Lundholm (2000) speculate that a third potential reason to anticipate disclosure increases for the 
issuing firms might be an increase in performance. Consequently, we explicitly control for the performance 
variable in both the earnings management and post-issue returns analyses. 
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Lang and Lundholm (2000) argue that issuers might use their disclosure policies to 
influence market perceptions. Based on a sample of 41 small SEO firms with detailed disclosure 
information, they find firms that substantially increase disclosure activity in the six months before 
the offering suffer large price declines subsequent to the offering announcement. Firms that 
maintain a consistent level of disclosure have no unusual return behavior. These authors argue 
that the increased disclosure activity is “hype.” In this “hype” environment, firms have an 
incentive to manage earnings upward to increase their offering proceeds. If issuers hype their 
stock by increasing disclosure frequency just prior to the offering, these firms will suffer greater 
post-issue underperformance. 
 
Prediction 4. Post-issue SEO performance is more negative for firms with a non-persistent 
disclosure increase.  
 
 
3.  Data and measurement 
3.1.   Data selection 
From the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database, we obtain an initial sample of 
1,950 common stock SEOs that occurred between January 1990 and December 1997. We 
examine post-offering returns over the one-year period after the active earnings management 
period. 3 We limit the sample to U.S. firms on the COMPUSTAT and Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) databases. Offerings by financial institutions are excluded because the 
nature of these firms’ accruals differs from that of industrial firms. We also exclude offerings 
filed within two years of the initial public offering to avoid the confounding effect of IPO 
performance.  
                                                 
3 We also examine post-offering returns up to five years after the offering, i.e., up to 2002. Unreported 
results indicate that greater disclosure frequency substantially reduces post-issue underperformance over 
the long run. 
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Of the 1,950 offerings, we search for press releases (our proxy of disclosure activity) for 
1,539 offerings (about 80%) from the press-release wires in the Dow Jones Interactive (DJI) 
database system. To keep the data collection manageable, we randomly choose offerings from 
each year in the sample period in 20% increments. We stop at 80% of the initial sample after 
confirming that annual and industry distributions are comparable to those of the initial sample. 
We exclude 50 offerings due to a lack of information. We drop an additional 58 offerings that 
were announced within two years of a spinoff or a merger that created the firm. It is not possible 
to obtain press releases before such spinoffs and mergers. Our final sample consists of 1,431 
offerings. Actual samples used in the analyses are slightly different, since the data availability 
varies for each regression analysis. We obtain the ownership data (institutional ownership, block 
ownership, and insider ownership) from the Spectrum of Compact Disclosure. We use the latest 
data available prior to the offering announcement.  
Table 1 reports the sample statistics and data characteristics for these 1,431 offerings. 
Panel A of Table 1 provides a summary of the size and offering characteristics. The mean and 
median of the book value of assets are $988 million and $146 million, respectively. The mean and 
median of equity market capitalization are $780 million and $200 million, respectively. The mean 
and median offering proceeds are $81 million and $43 million, respectively. The mean increase in 
shares due to the offering is 26%. Due to the large standard deviation in issuers’ market values, 
the average increase in new shares (26%) is much greater than the ratio of the average offer 
amount to the average market value of issuing firms (10.4%). (The medians do not show much 
discrepancy: 19% vs. 21.4%.) Seasoned equity issues are not clustered by time periods, except 
that 1990 carries only 5.8% of the issues. We find that chemical products and computer industries 
account for a large fraction of the issues, constituting more than 25% of the sample. 
 
3.2.   Measurement of disclosure frequency 
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We use the number of distinct press releases as our measure of disclosure frequency. We 
recognize that disclosure frequency is not necessarily a measure of disclosure quality; in fact, 
frequent disclosure with low information content can cumulatively provide less information than 
a single, highly informative disclosure. In addition, not all disclosure is the same (e.g., repeat 
disclosure, hype disclosure, and informative disclosure). Despite these problems, however, 
disclosure frequency serves as a proxy for an informative disclosure environment in previous 
studies (Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper, 1994; Clarkson, Kao, and Richardson, 1999; Lang and 
Lundholm, 2000; Schrand and Verrecchia, 2004), and we use it as well. 
We focus on the relation between disclosure frequency and earnings management. To 
capture a genuine relation between the two key variables, it is important to obtain a sufficient 
number of cross-sectional observations to ensure enough variation in earnings management in the 
sample. For this task, we scan through roughly 103,032 press releases (nine press releases per six-
month period on average multiplied by eight six-month periods within a four-year span around 
the SEO announcement multiplied by 1,431 SEOs). Prior studies include, at most, 3,000 to 5,000 
disclosure documents (Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper, 1994; Lang and Lundholm, 2000; 
Schrand and Verrecchia, 2004) for 82 (including matching firm sample) to 190 sample firms. 
Clearly, there is a tradeoff between using a small sample with content and using a large 
sample without content. Lang and Lundholm (2000) provide small-sample (41 firms) results on 
disclosure content for SEO firms. While they gain additional information by examining the content 
of disclosure, such content analysis restricts sample size. In addition, because media disclosure is 
typically biased towards large firms, and accruals predictability for returns is found to be stronger 
for smaller firms, we control for firm size in our estimation of earnings management. The number 
of press releases can also be interpreted as a proxy for other firm characteristics, such as firm 
performance (Lang and Lundholm, 1993, 1996). Thus, we control for firm performance in the 
estimation. 
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The number of press releases is driven by at least two factors: the management disclosure 
strategy (transparent vs. opaque) and reportable events. Firms with many reportable events (e.g., 
acquisitions, dividend changes, etc.) typically have more press releases. If reportable events have an 
impact on discretionary accruals, they will affect the interpretation of the results. Controls in the 
analyses for size and changes in performance, use of performance-matched discretionary accruals, 
and elimination of firms close to IPOs or spinoffs help control this effect. These attempts, however, 
do not fully disentangle the effect of reportable events from management disclosure strategies. To 
isolate somewhat the effect of management strategies on disclosure, we explicitly control for 
several reportable events that can affect discretionary accruals. For instance, firms with persistent 
poor performance that are involved in a restructuring are likely to have many reportable events and 
asset writedowns. Rees, Gill, and Gore (1996) find that abnormal accruals in the writedown year are 
significantly negative. Similarly, firms that undertake acquisitions are likely to have many 
reportable events and more negative accruals (e.g., goodwill amortization). In addition, firms with 
large dividend payouts or dividend increases, which increase the frequency of press releases, have 
higher-quality earnings (Skinner, 2004) and thus less motivation for earnings management. Hence, 
we control for these three types of reportable events in our analysis. 
 
3.3.   Count of press releases 
We identify the number of press releases by searching press-release wires in the DJI 
database system. We search firm-initiated press releases by using both the company name and the 
company ticker symbol and count the number of press releases in the eight six-month periods 
starting from two years prior to and ending two years after the SEO announcement.  
SEO announcement dates are obtained from the DJI database. We search for SEO 
announcements (including intention to file, approval by the company’s board, and stockholders’ 
approval) within the two years preceding the SEO filing date reported in the SDC database. When 
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we cannot find the SEO announcement before the SEO filing date, we treat the SEO filing date as 
the SEO announcement date.  
We count only distinct press releases. We exclude press releases authored by non-
company sources, since only firms’ voluntary choice to disclose is important in this study. We 
also exclude press releases related to offerings because these artificially inflate the number of 
press releases shortly before and after an offering announcement. However, if other information 
is included in the press release, we count the release. We adapt the above search for firms that 
change their ticker symbols or names during the period.  
Panels A and B of Table 2 present summary statistics of the number of press releases and 
changes in the number of press releases from the six-month periods before and after SEO 
announcements. M(-6, 0) is the last six-month period prior to the SEO announcement, and M(0, 
+6) is the first six-month period after the SEO announcement. All other six-month periods are 
similarly indexed relative to the offering announcement and are exhibited in Panels A and C. A 
more detailed time line is shown in Fig. 1. Press releases steadily increase over time until M(+6, 
+12), but changes after M(+6, +12) are statistically insignificant. Increases before offering 
announcements are significant at the 1% level, and offering firms have the largest increase in the 
number of press releases during the six-month period just prior to the offering announcement.    
If there is a positive trend in the frequency of press releases over time, a change in the 
number of press releases will not correctly represent managers’ true intentions to increase or 
decrease voluntary disclosure. Moreover, one cannot directly compare disclosure frequency in 
different years. To obtain a measure of disclosure frequency comparable across time periods, we 
rank the number of press releases within each year and convert the ranks to percentiles:  
 
Annual percentile rank  = (annual rank – 1) / (number of samples each year – 1)         (1) 
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We rank firms by the number of press releases within the sample. Since we count the 
number of press releases in the six-month periods relative to the SEO announcement dates, and 
the calendar dates of SEO announcements differ across the sample, the calendar time of the six-
month periods are all different across the sample. To define the year of a six-month period and to 
compare the six-month periods across the sample to rank the number of press releases, we apply 
the following conventions. If the SEO is announced in calendar year t, M(-6, 0) and M(0, +6) are 
classified as year t periods, M(-12, -6) and M(-18, -12) as year t-1 periods, M(-24, -18) as a year 
t-2 period, M(+6, +12) and M(+12, +18) as year t+1 periods, and M(+18, +24) as a year t+2 
period. We report the percentile ranking of the number of press releases and changes in the 
percentile rank based on years in Panels C and D. We provide an example of how we convert the 
number of press releases to the annual percentile rank in the Appendix. The percentile rank 
increases over the one-year period before the offering announcement and continues to increase 
until the one-year period after the announcement. The trend is reversed in the second year after 
the offering announcement.  
 
3.4.   Measurement of earnings management  
We estimate earnings management with performance-adjusted discretionary total accruals 
(ADTA), as suggested by Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005), who show that existing methods 
for estimating discretionary accruals are biased toward rejecting the null hypothesis of no 
earnings management when the event related to the incentive is associated with performance. 
Kothari et al. recommend adjusting discretionary accruals by subtracting discretionary accruals of 
control firms matched on prior-year return-on-assets (ROA) and industry. We thus match each 
SEO firm with a non-SEO firm from the same industry (using the two-digit SIC code), with the 
closest ROA (net income divided by lagged total assets) in the quarter before the SEO 
announcement. If any of the data are not available for the firm with the closest ROA, we move to 
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the firm with the next closest ROA. The ADTA for an SEO firm is the discretionary total accruals 
of the SEO firm minus the discretionary total accruals of the matched, non-SEO firm. 
Based on Hribar and Collins’ (2002) argument that studies using balance sheet data to 
calculate accruals are potentially contaminated when testing for earnings management, we 
calculate discretionary total accruals using data obtained directly from cash flow and income 
statements. Total accruals (TACC) of firm i at time t are defined as 
 
)/(][ 1−−= itititit ACFOEBXITACC               (2) 
 
where EBXI is earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (COMPUSTAT 
item 76), CFO is operating cash flow (from continuing operations) taken directly from the cash 
flow statement (COMPUSTAT item 108 – COMPUSTAT item 78), and A is total assets 
(COMPUSTAT item 44). Discretionary total accruals are estimated by the cross-sectional 
modified Jones (1991) model using two-digit SIC codes. 
Table 3 presents the median quarterly ADTA, discretionary total accruals (DTA) 
suggested by Hribar and Collins (2002), and the discretionary current accruals (DCA) (see 
Rangan, 1998), scaled by beginning assets, around SEO announcements. DTAs and DCAs are 
reported for comparison purposes. The quarter of the last earnings announcement before the 
offering announcement is labeled Q(-1). Q(0) is the quarter of the first earnings announcement 
after the offering announcement. All other quarters are similarly indexed relative to the offering 
announcement. We report medians because they are less likely to be influenced by extreme 
observations. Observation numbers vary, since the available data for the calculation of 
discretionary accruals vary across quarters. ADTA is positive at the 5% level in the Q(+1) to 
Q(+2) period only. Discretionary total accruals are significantly positive at the 5% level in the 
Q(0) to Q(+2) period and marginally significant in the Q(-3) and Q(-1) periods. Discretionary 
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current accruals are significantly positive at the 1% level in all quarters Q(-5) through Q(+4) 
based on the Wilcoxon signed rank test.  
This evidence suggests that ADTA is the most conservative of the three accruals-based 
measures of earnings management. We also discern that managers typically manage earnings 
more after the SEO than before the offering. These findings are quite different from those of 
Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a) and DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004), who suggest that 
firms manage earnings prior to the SEO, presumably in anticipation that investors will overvalue 
the stock and increase the offer proceeds. We document little earnings management in the 
quarters leading up to the SEO. Instead, most of the earnings management occurs in the two 
quarters after the issue. This difference in findings appears to be at least partially explained by the 
more sophisticated measurement of earnings management and is consistent with Rangan’s (1998) 
view that managers have incentives to manage earnings in the later quarters following an offering 
announcement because of concerns about lawsuits and lock-up agreements with underwriters. 
Because of the timing issue of earnings management, we use different accrual periods for the 
multivariate tests. 
Consistent with Rangan (1998), we calculate annualized discretionary accruals for the 
one-year period, Q(-1) through Q(+2), around the offering announcement. The median of 
performance-adjusted discretionary total accruals is 0.78% of total assets and is significantly 
positive at the 5% level. The medians of discretionary total accruals and discretionary current 
accruals are 1.47% and 4.31% of total assets, respectively, and both are significantly positive at 
the 1% level. We also conduct regression analyses with discretionary total accruals and 
discretionary current accruals and obtain qualitatively the same results, as reported in Section 4. 
 
3.5.   Windows of variable measurement 
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 In this section, we briefly discuss the measurement windows of our key variables: 
ADTA, disclosure frequency, disclosure change, and post-issue returns. We use annualized 
discretionary accruals for the one-year period, Q(-1) through Q(+2), around the offering 
announcement, consistent with Rangan (1998). In particular, Table 3 suggests that performance-
adjusted discretionary total accruals are greatest in this one-year period, even though they are 
significant in the Q(+1) and Q(+2) period only. DTA and DCA are also greatest in the Q(-1) 
through Q(+2) period. To examine whether using different accrual measurement windows affects 
our results, we use two additional proxies for earnings management. ADTA(-4, -1) is annualized, 
performance-adjusted discretionary accruals over Q(-4) through Q(-1). It includes only the 
quarters for which earnings are announced prior to the offering announcement. Kim and Park 
(2005) use discretionary accruals over two quarters, Q(-1) and Q(0), to test whether equity issuers 
employing aggressive accounting decisions also more aggressively push up their offer prices, 
thereby leading to a decrease in underpricing.4 In Kim and Park (2005), Q(-1) is defined as the 
last quarter for which a financial statement is available at the time of the offer, and we define Q(-
1) as the last quarter for which earnings are announced prior to the offering announcement. 
Though time references are not matched perfectly, the closest accrual measurement window is 
Q(-1) and Q(0) in our study. Therefore, we use ADTA(-1, 0) as our third proxy for earnings 
management.  
 With regards to the measurement window of the disclosure metric, we have two choices. 
The first is to take the variable window over the M(-24, -18) through M(+18, +24) period because 
maintaining a high level of disclosure over an extended period (even after the offering date) is 
important to make corporate information more transparent and hold investor attention. The 
                                                 
4  When issuers manage earnings, they try to take full advantage of favorable market valuation from 
earnings management. As a result, the increase in the offer price will exceed the increase in the closing 
price, leading to a decrease in underpricing where underpricing is defined as the closing market price on the 
offer day minus the offer price, divided by the offer price (Kim and Park, 2005). 
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second is to measure the disclosure frequency over the M(-24, -18) through M(0, +6) period, for 
which the end date approximately corresponds to the end date of the annual discretionary accruals 
measurement window, i.e., Q(+2).5 We choose the first because the effect of disclosure on returns 
is both concurrent and lasting, unlike the effect of earnings management. In this case, the end date 
of our disclosure measurement window corresponds approximately to the end of the return 
measurement window. We also use disclosure metrics measured over the M(-24, +18) through 
M(0, +6) period for a robustness check. 
 Regarding disclosure change, we measure the change in the percentile rank of the number 
of press releases from M(-12, -6) to M(-6, 0). Lang and Lundholm (2000) measure information 
disclosure in six-month periods relative to the offer date, while we use six-month periods relative to 
the SEO announcement date. Therefore, it is not possible to directly compare the six-month periods 
between the two studies. Since the median of the “waiting period,” the period between the date of 
filing and the offer date, is 35 days in our sample, and often the announcement date and the file date 
are the same, the six-month period just prior to the offer date in Lang and Lundholm (2000) is 
closest to M(-6, 0) in our sample. To make our results comparable to those in Lang and Lundholm 
(2000), we use the change in the percentile rank of the number of press releases from M(-12, -6) to 
M(-6, 0). 
 To capture the effect of subsequent disappointment by predictable declines in earnings 
caused by earnings management on post-issue returns, we start the post-issue return measurement 
period after the earnings management quarters. We measure the post-issue return performance of 
SEO firms by market-adjusted returns using the returns on the CRSP value-weighted market 
                                                 
5As we do not know the exact timing of earnings management, we examine various combinations of these 
six-month periods for the window in which we measure disclosure frequency and changes of the frequency. 
Regardless of the various windows used, we observe a negative correlation between disclosure frequency 
and earnings management and a positive correlation between disclosure frequency and post-issue 
performance. 
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index as market returns. Returns are compounded daily over the one-year period beginning after 
the Q(+2) earnings announcement. 
 
4.   Empirical results  
4.1.   Bivariate relations  
 We first consider the bivariate relation between disclosure frequency and earnings 
management. The bivariate correlation coefficients between disclosure frequency and the 
earnings management variables reported in Table 4 are generally significant and negative. The 
negative relation between disclosure frequency and earnings management does not change with 
disclosure frequency measured across various time spans or with different proxies of earnings 
management. These findings are consistent with our first prediction that earnings management is 
a decreasing function of persistent disclosure. 
 The relation between disclosure changes and earnings management reported in Table 4 
suggests that the relation between ADTA and disclosure change, i.e., PTDC1 (changes in the 
percentile rank of the number of press releases from M(-12, -6) to M(-6, 0)) or PTDC2 (changes 
in the percentile rank of the number of press releases from M(-18, -12) to M(-12, -6), is 
insignificant. 
 
4.2.   The relation between disclosure frequency and earnings management 
In examining the effect of disclosure on earnings management, we control for other 
determinants of earnings management to reduce a possible misspecification problem due to 
correlated, omitted variables. Numerous studies document that earnings management is 
negatively associated with operating cash flow, change in performance, auditor quality, and the 
absolute value of total accruals (Dechow, 1994; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Becker, DeFond, 
Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam, 1998). Thus, we include operating cash flow, change in ROA, 
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auditor quality, and the absolute value of total accruals as explanatory variables. In addition, 
previous research suggests that the incentive to manipulate earnings upward is smaller for larger 
firms because they are more politically sensitive and thus any earnings management is more 
likely to be detected (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981). Earnings 
management might increase when firms are close to violating debt covenants. The debt-to-equity 
ratio is used as a proxy for the closeness to debt covenant violations. Ownership structure also 
might affect earnings management. For instance, Igan and Pinheiro (2004) show how insider 
ownership affects the decision to manage earnings. Shang (2003) discusses the relation between 
earnings management and institutional ownership.  
Firms that undertake SEOs are not a random sample. Thus, an increase in disclosure 
frequency could be observed due to an increase in information related to the offering. It is 
possible that SEO firms experience events that require additional disclosure, such as new 
investment opportunities. Therefore, it is difficult to assess whether the relation between high 
levels of disclosure and earnings management is attributable to a firm’s disclosure strategy or to 
changes in investment opportunities. Thus, we incorporate several control variables for 
investment opportunities into the regression equations, including Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) 
measure of Tobin’s q. This measure of Tobin’s q is consistent with those of Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003) and Oxelheim and Randøy (2003). Skinner (1993) shows that several proxies of 
the investment opportunity set are associated with a firm’s accounting procedure choice in the 
presence of debt and compensation contracts. Following Skinner (1993), our regressions include 
gross property, plant, and equipment divided by the market value of assets in the last fiscal year 
ending before the SEO announcement (PPE_V), as well as research and development expense 
divided by net sales in the last fiscal year ending before the SEO announcement (RDint).  
Finally, to control for reportable events that affect both discretionary accruals and 
disclosure frequency, we include in the regression analyses the number of asset writedown 
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disclosures, the number of dividend change disclosures, and the number of acquisition events. 
The number of acquisition events is obtained from the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database. 
We estimate the earnings management regressions as follows: 
 
ADTA = a + b1 DL + b2 DC + b3 OCF + b4 CROA + b5 SIZE + b6 LEV  
              + b7 NONB6 + b8 ABSTACC + b9 Tobin’s q + b10 PPE_V  
              + b11 RDint + b12 INSTI + b13 BLOCK + b14 INSIDER  
              + b15 A_WD + b16 DIV + b17 ACQ               (3) 
 
 
where ADTA is annualized, performance-adjusted discretionary total accruals over the period Q(-
1) through Q(+2) for ADTA(-1, +2), Q(-4) through Q(-1) for ADTA(-4, -1), or Q(-1) and Q(0) 
for ADTA(-1, 0), scaled by lagged total assets; DL is an average percentile rank of the number of 
press releases per six-month period over M(-24, -18) through M(+18, +24); DC is changes in the 
percentile rank of the number of press releases in M(-6, 0) from M(-12, -6); OCF is operating cash 
flows over the period Q(-1) through Q(+2) for a dependent variable ADTA(-1, +2), Q(-4) through 
Q(-1) for ADTA(-4, -1), or Q(-1) and Q(0) for ADTA (-1, 0), scaled by lagged total assets; 
CROA is the change in annualized ROA, measured as income before extraordinary items 
summed over Q(+3) to Q(+6) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(+3) minus income 
before extraordinary items summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-
1); SIZE is the log of the market value of equity at Q(-1); LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio, our 
proxy for the closeness to violations of lending contracts; NONB6 is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the firm’s auditor is not one of the big six accounting firms, and zero otherwise; 
ABSTACC is the absolute value of total accruals over the period Q(-1) through Q(+2) for a 
dependent variable ADTA(-1, +2), Q(-4) through Q(-1) for ADTA(-4, -1), or Q(-1) and Q(0) for 
ADTA (-1, 0), scaled by lagged total assets; Tobin’s q is Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) measure of 
Tobin’s q and calculated as {[Market value of common stock + Book value of preferred stock + 
Book value of long-term debt + Book value of current liabilities – (Book value of current assets – 
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Book value of inventories)] / Book value of total assets} in the last fiscal year ending before the 
SEO announcement; PPE_V is gross property, plant, and equipment divided by the market value 
of equity plus the book value of debt in the last fiscal year ending before the SEO announcement; 
RDint is research and development expense divided by net sales in the last fiscal year ending 
before the SEO announcement; INSTI (institutional ownership) is the percent of equity held by 
institutional investment managers having equity assets under management of $100 million or 
more; BLOCK (block ownership) is the percent of equity held by those owning more than 5% of 
a class of the company’s equity securities; INSIDER (insider ownership) is the percent of equity 
held by company officers, directors, and any beneficial owners that represents more than 10% of 
a class of the company’s equity securities; A_WD is the number of asset writedown disclosures 
over M(-24, -18) through M(+18, +24); DIV is the number of dividend change disclosures over 
M(-24, -18) through M(+18, +24); and ACQ is the number of acquisition events over M(-24, -18) 
through M(+18, +24). The results are qualitatively the same if we use dummy variables that take 
a value of one if the issuer experiences reportable events over the four-year window and zero 
otherwise. 
 Table 5 presents the results of various OLS regressions based on different accrual 
periods. The results show that DL exerts a significant, negative influence on ADTA under all 
models. The negative relation holds even after we control for investment opportunities and 
reportable events. The results provide empirical support for our first prediction of a negative 
relation between disclosure frequency and earnings management. When we use ADTA(-4, -1), a 
variable measured during the period strictly before the offering announcement, the coefficient on 
DL is smaller but still statistically significant at the 5% level. This result implies a relatively 
weaker relation between DL and earnings management during this period, at least partially 
reflecting statistically insignificant discretionary accruals during this period, as reported in Table 
3.  Disclosure change (DC) does not have a significant impact on ADTA. We find that ADTA is 
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negatively associated with operating cash flow (OCF) and changes in performance (CROA). 
These results support Dechow’s (1994) finding that discretionary accruals are negatively 
correlated with operating cash flows. The negative relation between ADTA and CROA supports 
the finding of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) that earnings are managed to avoid losses and 
negative changes in earnings. We also find that ADTA is positively associated with insider 
ownership (INSIDER), supporting Igan and Pinheiro’s (2004) finding that insider ownership 
increases incentives to manage earnings. Additionally, as we anticipated, we find a negative 
association between ADTA and the number of acquisition events (ACQ). A negative relation 
between ADTA and R&D intensity (RDint) is consistent with Skinner’s (1993) results based on 
the goodwill and depreciation choice, while it is inconsistent with his results based on the 
inventory method choice. Our results are also generally consistent with Jo and Kim’s (2005) 
finding that managers of SEO firms with R&D tend to choose voluntary disclosure over earnings 
management, and with Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique’s (2004) finding that R&D increases are 
beneficial investments that lead to positive, long-term operating performance.   
The results in Table 5 show that there is a positive relation between disclosure levels and 
performance-adjusted abnormal accruals over the period Q(-1) through Q(+2). This relation 
seems to also exist, though it is weaker, for performance-adjusted abnormal accruals over the 
period Q(-4) through Q(-1). The second finding is somewhat difficult to interpret because of 
statistically insignificant discretionary accruals during this period. To examine if there is a more 
general relation between performance-adjusted abnormal accruals and disclosure even without 
SEOs, we run the regression using disclosure measured in M(-24, -18) and performance-adjusted 
abnormal accruals for the same period. The period M(-24, -18) is selected since it is the period 
farthest from the SEO for which we have data on the number of press releases. Since M(-24, -18) 
spans three quarters, Q(-8), Q(-7), and Q(-6), we measure performance-adjusted abnormal 
accruals over the period Q(-8) thorough Q(-6). The unreported results show a statistically 
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insignificant relation between performance-adjusted abnormal accruals and disclosure for this 
period, lending more weight to the argument that the findings observed around the SEO are 
caused by the SEO, and not by some more general relation. 
We also conduct a couple of sensitivity analyses. First, to further control for issuers’ 
investment opportunities, we examine whether pre-issue disclosure levels are related to ADTA. 
These pre-issue disclosure levels are more likely to reflect management’s disclosure strategies 
than new content related to their decisions to make SEOs. We measure the pre-issue disclosure 
level (PreDL) as the average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period 
over M(-24, -18) through M(-12, -6). The unreported results based upon PreDL suggest a strong 
negative relation between ADTA and PreDL, supporting transparency-increasing disclosure. 
Second, we examine the relation between ADTA and DL with the positive ADTA sample only. 
Managers of firms with unusual income-decreasing accruals have a strong incentive to provide 
extensive disclosure at the time of an equity offering to prevent possible lawsuits from investors 
and to make sure that investors do not misinterpret their poor reported performance (Skinner, 
1994, 1997). To rule out this alternative explanation for a negative relation between earnings 
management and disclosure frequency, we conduct the regression using income-increasing 
accruals, i.e., positive ADTA only, and find a strong negative relation between ADTA and DL. 
When we conduct the same tests with samples of only income-decreasing discretionary accruals, 
however, the empirical relation is statistically insignificant. These unreported results provide 
additional evidence that firms with high disclosure are less likely to manage earnings. 
  
4.3.   Regression results of post-issue return performance 
We measure the post-issue return performance of SEO firms by market-adjusted returns, 
using the returns on the CRSP value-weighted market index as our market returns. Returns are 
compounded daily over the one-year period after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. The mean 
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and median of post-issue returns are –12.75% and –21.95%, respectively and are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. We regress the post-issue return performance on ADTA and 
disclosure frequency. The log of the market value of equity, the book-to-market ratio, and 
operating performance variables are included as control variables:    
AR1Y = a + b1*ADTA + b2*DL + b3*DC + b4*ADTA*DL + b5*ADTA*DC  
              + b6*ADTA*SIZE + b7*ADTA*ROA + b8*ADTA*CROA + b9*SIZE  
              + b10*ROA + b11*CROA + b12*BM + e               (4) 
 
where AR1Y is the market-adjusted return over the one-year period after the Q(+2) earnings 
announcement; ROA is the annualized return on assets (ROA) measured as income before 
extraordinary items summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1); 
and BM is the book-to-market ratio at Q(-1).  The other variables are defined as before. 
Table 6 reports the results from the regressions of post-issue returns (regression model 
(4)) on disclosure frequency, disclosure change, performance-adjusted discretionary total 
accruals, and other control variables. We exclude observations with values at the top and bottom 
1% of abnormal returns and discretionary accruals. As expected, we find that post-issue 
performance is positively related to disclosure frequency (DL) both with and without ADTA in 
the regressions over the various accrual periods. This result provides empirical support for our 
second prediction that post-SEO performance is less negative for firms with more disclosure. 
These results remain qualitatively the same when we estimate earnings management using DTA 
or DCA. 6 
                                                 
6 Shivakumar (2000) argues that measures of abnormal returns used in prior research are misspecified due 
to skewness in the long-horizon returns data.  Using long-run measures of abnormal returns suggested by 
Barber and Lyon (1997) and Cowan and Sergeant (2001), he finds the coefficient estimate in the regression 
of post-issue abnormal returns on pre-issue abnormal accruals to be insignificant and often to have the 
wrong sign. Instead, he finds a negative relation between pre-issue abnormal accruals and a price reaction 
at offering announcements.  However, this misspecification issue is irrelevant to our study because our 
return window is one year. In Barber and Lyon (1997) and Cowan and Sergeant (2001), problems 
associated with long-run return specifications appear in the three- to five-year return horizons.  Dichev and 
Piotroski (2001) also do not make any explicit adjustment for long-run return specification problems when 
they examine long-run stock returns following bond-rating changes because none of their return windows is 
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We find that post-issue return performance is positively related to the operating 
performance measures of ROA and CROA. The results also show that the coefficients on ADTA 
are negative and significant. The negative effect of earnings management on post-issue 
performance is in line with the findings of Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a) and Rangan (1998). 
If a disclosure increase reduces information asymmetry, we should observe a positive coefficient 
on DC. However, we find that the effect on DC is insignificant. This could be due to the inclusion 
of hyping firms in the sample because the relation between post-issue returns and disclosure 
change would be negative for issuers that hype stock. We also include interactive variables that 
tie ADTA to DL (and DC) to test the argument of Healy and Wahlen (1999) that disclosure might 
help investors make more informed estimates of the likelihood of earnings management. If this 
were true, then we should observe a positive coefficient on the interaction of ADTA and DL (and 
DC). Our results reveal, however, that the estimated coefficient on the interaction of ADTA and 
DL (and DC) is insignificant (positive and marginally significant). The empirical associations 
among the post-issue return, firm size, and book-to-market are also insignificant.  
We further examine whether our results are sensitive to the time period over which 
disclosure frequency is measured. In particular, we measure disclosure frequency over the M(-24, 
-18) through M(0, +6) period to match the end date of the period with that of the accruals window 
over which ADTA(-1, +2) is measured. Though not reported, the results are qualitatively the 
same as those reported in Table 6, suggesting that the relation between disclosure frequency and 
post-issue returns is quite robust and not sensitive to the different periods over which disclosure 
frequency is measured. We also estimate the earnings management regression, Eq. (3), with 
disclosure frequency measured over the M(-24, -18) through M(0, +6) period; unreported results 
are qualitatively the same as those reported in Table 5. 
                                                                                                                                                 
longer than one year.  For the same reason, we do not adjust for long-run return specification problems in 
this study. 
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4.4.   Disclosure strategies, earnings management, and post-issue returns 
 As previously noted, firms have different disclosure strategies. The types of firms include 
(i) high-disclosure firms that have consistently high disclosure both before and after the issue; (ii) 
hyping firms that have low disclosure prior to the offer, but temporarily boost disclosure in the 
months prior to the offer completion; and (iii) low-disclosure firms that have consistently low 
disclosure levels throughout the offer period. We can test all of our hypotheses by examining how 
these strategy differences are associated with SEO earnings management and post-SEO return 
performance.  
We develop the following algorithm to identify firms’ disclosure strategies and use 
indicator variables to represent these strategies in our tests. D1 is a dummy variable that is set to 
one if the average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(-
24, -18) through M(-6, 0) is in the top third and the average percentile rank of the number of press 
releases per six-month period over M(+6, +12) through M(+18, +24) is in the top third as well, 
and zero otherwise. D2 is a dummy variable that is set to one if the percentile rank of the number 
of press releases of M(-6, 0) is greater than the average percentile rank of the number of press 
releases per six-month period over M(-24, -18) through M(-12, -6) and greater than the average 
percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(+12, +18) and 
M(+18, +24), and zero otherwise. We impose this restriction to select the group of issuers with a 
non-persistent increase in disclosure. D3 is a dummy variable that is set to one if the average 
percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(-24, -18) through 
M(-6, 0) is in the bottom third and the average percentile rank of the number of press releases per 
six-month period over M(+6, +12) through M(+18, +24) is in the bottom third as well, and zero 
otherwise.  
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 Panel A of Table 7 reports the results of the associations between earnings management 
and different disclosure strategies, and Panel B presents the effects of different disclosure 
strategies on post-issue returns. As anticipated, we find that ADTA is negatively related to D1 
(high-disclosure firms) for all of the different accrual periods and positively related to D2 (hyping 
disclosure) for all periods except ADTA(-4,-1), supporting our predictions 1 and 3 about earnings 
management and disclosure. The positive relation between ADTA (-1, +2) or ADTA(-1, 0) and 
D2 combined with an insignificant relation between ADTA(-4, -1) and D2 suggests a possibility 
that earnings management in hyping firms occurs through the lock-up period, not just in the 
period before the offering. The coefficients on D3 (low-disclosure firms) are positive and 
significant with ADTA(-1, +2). The results of significant relations between ADTA(-1, +2) and 
D2, as well as D3, are also in line with the earlier finding reported in Table 3 that firms manage 
earnings more after the SEO than before the offering. These results are supportive of Rangan 
(1998). In addition, the negative relations between OCF and ADTA and between CROA and 
ADTA do not change.  
In Panel B of Table 7, we find that post-issue returns are positively related to D1 and 
negatively related to D2 for all of the different accrual periods, supporting predictions 2 and 4 
about post-SEO performance and disclosure. The negative association between ADTA and post-
issue returns, and the positive relations between ROA and post-issue returns and between CROA 
and post-issue returns, are preserved. The coefficients on D3 in the return regressions are positive 
but insignificant.  
We also examine the combined effect of high temporary disclosure and earnings 
management on post-issue stock returns. We create a dummy variable, DADTA, set to one if 
ADTA is larger than or equal to its median value, and zero otherwise. We include the interaction 
variable of D2 and DADTA in the regression. If the post-issue stock price decline is even greater 
for firms that have both high temporary disclosure and high performance-adjusted abnormal 
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accruals, we will observe a significantly negative coefficient on this interaction variable. The 
unreported result shows a statistically insignificant coefficient. In addition, we run the regression 
including the interaction of D2 and ADTA; the coefficient on this interaction variable is also 
statistically insignificant. Therefore, we do not find evidence of a combined effect of opaque 
disclosure and earnings management on post-issue stock returns.  
As an alternative convention to categorize the hyping sample, we classify issuers as 
hyping firms when the issuer’s market capitalization is less than $150 million, following Lang and 
Lundholm (2000), and the percentile rank of the number of press releases of M(-6, 0) is greater than 
both the average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(-24, -
18) through M(-12, -6) and the average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month 
period over M(+12, +18) and M(+18, +24). In unreported results, we find a significantly positive 
(negative) relation between a sudden increase in disclosure prior to the offering and ADTA (post-
issue returns). Overall, we interpret these results to indicate that transparency-increasing 
disclosure strategies reduce managers’ incentives to manage earnings around the offerings and 
reduce post-SEO stock underperformance, while transparency-reducing (opaque) disclosure 
strategies increase earnings management and post-SEO stock underperformance.  
 
5.   Conclusions  
While both disclosure and earnings management receive high attention in the study of 
corporate finance and accounting, direct evidence of the empirical relations between the two and 
between disclosure and corporate performance is scarce. We first examine the relation between 
information disclosure and earnings management around SEOs. Our findings suggest that 
disclosure frequency in general is negatively associated with various proxies for earnings 
management. We also find evidence that greater disclosure frequency reduces information 
asymmetry, exposes earnings management, and therefore reduces SEO firms’ incentive to 
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manage earnings. However, firms that substantially, but temporarily, increase disclosure prior to 
the offering also manage their earnings aggressively. We surmise that these firms intend to reduce 
transparency and to hype their firms’ stock.  
In addition, we find that disclosure frequency around the announcement of a seasoned 
equity offering is positively related to the SEO firm’s post-issue performance. This evidence 
supports the notion that greater disclosure frequency helps reduce information asymmetry, 
enhances the transparency of earnings, improves SEO pricing, and reduces post-issue SEO 
underperformance. The direction of this relation is consistent with the common intuition that 
enhancing the transparency of economic earnings will eventually improve firm performance. The 
results of this study also suggest that the supply of corporate information is determined, in part, 
by the SEO firm’s post-issue performance considerations. As anticipated, however, hyping firms 
experience greater post-issue underperformance. 
There are several issues for future research. First, developing the theoretical framework 
that explains the relation between information disclosure and earnings management will enhance 
our understanding of why firms disclose in general. Second, the motives behind information 
disclosure in seasoned equity offerings should be examined more closely. Skinner (1994, 1997) 
and Goel and Thakor (2003) hypothesize that efforts to avoid lawsuits and to smooth income 
could partially explain why firms disclose. To structure different motivations and investor 
reactions, a convincing theory of information disclosure in an SEO setting would be useful. 
Finally, it would be interesting, though challenging, to examine the detailed content of 
information disclosure with a sufficient number of observations in an equity offering market. 
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Appendix. An example of conversion from the number of press releases (PRs) to annual 
percentile rank 
 
Observation #1   SEO   
       4/18/1995       
                 
6-month periods M(-24, -18) M(-18, -12) M(-12, -6) M(-6, 0) M(0, +6) M(+6, +12) M(+12, +18) M(+18, +24)
Calendar year assigned         
for the annual ranking 1993 1994 1994 1995 1995 1996 1996 1997 
Number of PRs 8 6 9 10 9 11 12 11 
         
Observation #2   SEO   
       9/7/1995       
                 
6-month periods M(-24, -18) M(-18, -12) M(-12, -6) M(-6, 0) M(0, +6) M(+6, +12) M(+12, +18) M(+18, +24)
Calendar year assigned         
for the annual ranking 1993 1994 1994 1995 1995 1996 1996 1997 
Number of PRs 22 21 24 30 28 32 33 33 
         
Observation #3   SEO   
       7/20/1996       
                 
6-month periods M(-24, -18) M(-18, -12) M(-12, -6) M(-6, 0) M(0, +6) M(+6, +12) M(+12, +18) M(+18, +24)
Calendar year assigned         
for the annual ranking 1994 1995 1995 1996 1996 1997 1997 1998 
Number of PRs 6 6 6 9 8 9 9 8 
         
Observation #4   SEO   
       11/3/1997       
                 
6-month periods M(-24, -18) M(-18, -12) M(-12, -6) M(-6, 0) M(0, +6) M(+6, +12) M(+12, +18) M(+18, +24)
calendar year assigned         
for the annual ranking 1995 1996 1996 1997 1997 1998 1998 1999 
Number of PRs 13 13 14 17 15 18 18 19 
         
 
  Number of PRs annual rank annual percentile rank* 
     
1996 PRs from Observation #1 M(+6, +12) 11 3 0.2857 
 from Observation #1 M(+12, +18) 12 4 0.4286 
 from Observation #2 M(+6, +12) 32 7 0.8571 
 from Observation #2 M(+12, +18) 33 8 1 
 from Observation #3 M(-6, 0) 9 2 0.1486 
 from Observation #3 M(0, +6) 8 1 0 
 from Observation #4 M(-18, -12) 13 5 0.5714 
 from Observation #4 M(-12, -6) 14 6 0.7143 
     
 Number of samples in 1996: 8   
     
 * (annual rank – 1) / (number of samples each year – 1) 
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Table 1 
Sample characteristics of seasoned equity offerings 
 
This table summarizes our sample of 1,431 seasoned equity offerings of common stock by U.S. industrial firms over 
the period 1990 through 1997. Total assets, market value of equity, and book value of equity are measured at the end of 
the quarter before the offering announcement.  Offer size is computed as the number of shares offered divided by the 
number of shares outstanding before the offering. 
 
Panel A: Size Characteristics 
 
 Total assets 
($ millions) 
 Market value
($ millions)
Book value 
($ millions)
Offer amount 
($ millions)
 Offer size 
(%) 
Mean 987.59  780.30 291.89 81.20  26 
Median 146.30  199.81 62.15 42.79  19 
Std. dev. 3,641.10  2,907.04 918.63 131.92  32 
 
Panel B: Time Distribution 
 
Year SEO frequency % of total 
1990   83   5.80 
1991 190 13.28 
1992 173 12.09 
1993 200 13.98 
1994 149 10.41 
1995 189 13.21 
1996 231 16.14 
1997 216 15.09 
 
Panel C: Industry distribution 
 
Industry SIC codes SEO frequency % of total
Oil and gas 13 104   7.75 
Food products 20  17   1.27 
Paper and paper products 24,25,26,27  41   3.06 
Chemical products 28 160 11.93 
Manufacturing 30-34  58   4.33 
Computer equipment and services 35,73 184 13.72 
Electronic equipment 36 101   7.53 
Transportation 37,39,40-42,44,45  86   6.41 
Scientific instruments 38  84   6.26 
Communications 48  46   3.43 
Electricity, gas, and sanitary services 49 118   8.80 
Durable goods 50  60   4.47 
Non-durable goods 51  26   1.94 
Retail 53,54,56,57,59 105   7.83 
Eating and drinking establishments 58  23   1.72 
Entertainment services 70,78,79  40   2.98 
Health 80  45   3.36 
All others   43   3.21 
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Table 2 
Level of and changes in the frequency of disclosure proxied by press releases 
 
This table shows the number of distinct press releases authored by the company for the four-year span starting from 
two years prior to and ending two years after the seasoned equity offering announcement. This four-year period is 
divided into eight six-month periods, and the number of press releases by each SEO firm is counted for each six-month 
period.  M(-6, 0) is the last six-month period prior to the SEO announcement, and M(0, +6) is the first six-month period 
after the SEO announcement. For example, six months to one day before the SEO announcement is M(-6, 0) and one 
day after the SEO to six months after the SEO announcement is M(0, +6). All other six-month periods are similarly 
indexed relative to the offering announcement. Since the average number of press releases is about nine per six-month 
period for our final 1,431 SEOs, we read roughly 103,032 press releases (nine press releases per six-month period 
multiplied by eight six-month periods within a four-year span around the SEO announcement multiplied by 1,431 
SEOs), not including duplicates and non-company sources. Changes are measured as the changes in the number of 
press releases from the previous six-month period.  To obtain a time-consistent measure of disclosure frequency, we 
rank the number of press releases within each year. Because there are different numbers of samples each year, we 
convert the ranks to percentiles: (annual rank – 1)/(number of samples per year – 1).  
 
Panel A: Number of press releases 
 
  Mean Median First quartile 
Third 
quartile 
Months -24 to -18 M(-24, -18) 7.06 4 1 8 
Months -18 to -12 M(-18, -12) 7.83 5 2 8 
Months -12 to -6 M(-12, -6) 8.33 5 3 9 
Months -6 to 0 M(-6, 0) 9.46 6 3 10 
Months 0 to +6 M(0, +6) 9.66 6 3 10 
Months +6 to +12 M(+6, +12) 10.43 7 4 11 
Months +12 to +18 M(+12, +18) 10.42 7 4 12 
Months +18 to +24 M(+18, +24) 10.58 7 4 12 
 
 
Panel B: Changes in the number of press releases 
 
 Mean Median      t-test p-value 
Wilcoxon
   p-value 
From M(-24, -18) to M(-18, -12) 0.77     0 0.0001 0.0001
From M(-18, -12) to M(-12, -6) 0.50     0 0.0013 0.0001
From M(-12, -6) to M(-6, 0) 1.13     0 0.0001 0.0001
From M(-6, 0) to M(0, +6) 0.20     0 0.2965 0.0765
From M(0, +6) to M(+6, +12) 0.77     0 0.0001 0.0001
From M(+6, +12) to M(+12, +18) -0.01     0 0.9382 0.6411
From M(+12, +18) to M(+18, +24) 0.17     0 0.3085 0.4214
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Table 2: continued 
 
Panel C: Percentile rank of the number of press releases 
 
  Mean Median First quartile 
Third 
quartile 
Months -24 to -18 M(-24, -18) 0.4674 0.4186 0.2320 0.7051 
Months -18 to -12 M(-18, -12) 0.4563 0.4375 0.2136 0.7004 
Months -12 to -6 M(-12, -6) 0.4886 0.4898 0.2352 0.7407 
Months -6 to 0 M(-6, 0) 0.5065 0.5040 0.2414 0.7547 
Months 0 to +6 M(0, +6) 0.5089 0.5028 0.2414 0.7520 
Months +6 to +12 M(+6, +12) 0.5288 0.5286 0.3018 0.7698 
Months +12 to +18 M(+12, +18) 0.5311 0.5430 0.2944 0.7878 
Months +18 to +24 M(+18, +24) 0.5134 0.5028 0.2449 0.7859 
 
 
Panel D: Changes in the percentile rank of the number of press releases 
 
 Mean Median      t-test p-value 
Wilcoxon
      p-value 
From M(-24, -18) to M(-18, -12) -0.0110 -0.0092 0.0317 0.0002
From M(-18, -12) to M(-12, -6) 0.0319 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001
From M(-12, -6) to M(-6, 0) 0.0179 0.0006 0.0005 0.0070
From M(-6, 0) to M(0, +6) 0.0028 0.0000 0.5846 0.5980
From M(0, +6) to M(+6, +12) 0.0205 0.0030 0.0001 0.0003
From M(+6, +12) to M(+12, +18) 0.0024 0.0000 0.6396 0.6393
From M(+12, +18) to M(+18, +24) -0.0177 -0.0092 0.0012 0.0015
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Table 3 
Median discretionary accruals around seasoned equity offerings 
 
This table shows discretionary accruals as the difference between realized accruals and predicted (normal) accruals 
(scaled by assets at the beginning of the quarter). We estimate discretionary total accruals as suggested by Hribar and 
Collins (2002) and discretionary current accruals following Rangan (1998).  When estimating normal accruals, cross-
sectional estimation is used by estimating parameters across all firms in the same two-digit SIC as the sample firm.  
Performance-adjusted discretionary total accruals are calculated following Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005). We create 
a control sample based on ROA in the quarter before the SEO announcement and on industry (using the two-digit SIC 
code) for each offering. The performance-adjusted discretionary accruals for an SEO firm are the discretionary total 
accruals for that firm minus the discretionary total accruals of the matched, non-SEO firm. The quarter of the last 
earnings announcement before the offering announcement is labeled Q(-1).  Q(0) is the quarter of the first earnings 
announcement after the offering announcement. All other quarters are similarly indexed relative to the offering 
announcement. Observation numbers vary, since the available data for the calculation of discretionary accruals vary 
across quarters. 
 
 Performance-adjusted 
discretionary accruals 
(ADTA) 
 Discretionary total accruals (DTA)  
Discretionary current accruals 
(DCA) 
Quarters N Median Wilcoxon p-values  N Median 
Wilcoxon 
p-values  N Median 
Wilcoxon 
p-values 
Q(-5) 496 0.07% 0.9319  735 0.04% 0.3351 968 0.53% 0.0001
Q(-4) 514 -0.29% 0.9432  779 0.00% 0.9770 978 0.41% 0.0074
Q(-3) 557 0.06% 0.9089  787 0.36% 0.0502 986 0.44% 0.0002
Q(-2) 619 0.00% 0.6823  843 0.22% 0.1514 993 0.51% 0.0001
Q(-1) 671 -0.06% 0.6115  822 0.17% 0.0611 978 0.77% 0.0001
Q(0) 677 0.25% 0.4990  856 0.32% 0.0066 964 0.76% 0.0001
Q(+1) 677 0.50% 0.0105  865 0.68% 0.0001 968 1.25% 0.0001
Q(+2) 675 0.63% 0.0458  892 0.49% 0.0001 973 1.04% 0.0001
Q(+3) 644   -0.19% 0.6922  874 0.17% 0.1454 957 0.78% 0.0001
Q(+4) 610 -0.75% 0.1169  883 0.01% 0.7033 944 0.68% 0.0001
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Table 4 
Correlation between disclosure frequency and discretionary accruals 
 
This table presents Spearman rank correlations between annualized discretionary accruals and several disclosure 
measure metrics (using the number of press releases and percentile rank of the number based on the year) averaged 
over different time periods. The followings are the disclosure metrics used. DLs are average number of press releases 
per six-month period over the following time periods.  DL1: over M(-24, -18) through M(+18, +24); DL2: over M(-24, 
-18) through M(0, +6); DL3: over M(-24, -18) through M(+6, +12); DL4: over M(-24, -18) through M(-6, 0); DL5: 
over M(-24, -18) through M(-12, -6); DL6: over M(-12, -6) through M(-6, 0); DL7: over M(0, +6) through M(+12, 
+18); DL8: over M(+6, +12) through M(+18, +24); DC1: changes in the number of press releases from M(-12, -6) to 
M(-6, 0); DC2: changes in the number of press releases from M(-18, -12) to M(-12, -6). PTDLs are average percentile 
rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over the following time periods.  PTDL1: over M(-24, -18) 
through M(+18, +24); PTDL2: over M(-24, -18) through M(0, +6); PTDL3: over M(-24, -18) through M(+6, +12); 
PTDL4: over M(-24, -18) through M(-6, 0); PTDL5: over M(-24, -18) through M(-12, -6); PTDL6: over M(-12, -6) 
through M(-6, 0); PTDL7: over M(0, +6) through M(+12, +18); PTDL8: over M(+6, +12) through M(+18, +24); 
PTDC1: changes in the percentile rank of the number of press releases from M(-12, -6) to M(-6, 0); PTDC2: changes in 
the percentile rank of the number of press releases from M(-18, -12) to M(-12, -6). ADTA(-1. +2) is annualized, 
performance-adjusted discretionary total accruals over the period Q(-1) through Q(+2) scaled by lagged total assets.  
DTA(-1, +2) is annualized discretionary total accruals over the period Q(-1) through Q(+2) scaled by lagged total 
assets.  ***, **, * significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in two-sided significance tests, respectively. 
 
 
   ADTA(-1, +2) DTA(-1, +2) 
DL1 -0.0897** -0.1099***
DL2 -0.0880** -0.0973** 
DL3 -0.0810** -0.1061***
DL4 -0.0877** -0.1235***
DL5 -0.0778** -0.0922** 
DL6 -0.0845** -0.0973** 
DL7 -0.0744* -0.1284***
DL8 -0.0786** -0.1259***
DC1 -0.0356 -0.0287 
DC2 0.0304 -0.0182 
  ADTA(-1, +2) DTA(-1, +2) 
PTDL1 -0.0957** -0.1112***
PTDL2 -0.0900** -0.0994***
PTDL3 -0.0852** -0.1037***
PTDL4 -0.0885** -0.1213***
PTDL5 -0.0799** -0.0868** 
PTDL6 -0.0813** -0.0994***
PTDL7 -0.0838** -0.1230***
PTDL8 -0.0876** -0.1232***
PTDC1 -0.0462 -0.0295 
PTDC2 0.0206 -0.0294 
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Table 5 
Regression analysis: association between disclosure frequency and earnings management 
 
This table reports the results of association tests between disclosure and discretionary accruals of SEO firms. The following equation is estimated:  
    
ADTA = a + b1 DL + b2 DC + b3 OCF + b4 CROA + b5 SIZE + b6 LEV + b7 NONB6 + b8 ABSTACC + b9 Tobin’s q  
               + b10 PPE_V + b11 RDint + b12 INSTI + b13 BLOCK + b14 INSIDER + b15 A_WD + b16 DIV + b17 ACQ  
 
where ADTA = performance-adjusted discretionary total accruals over the period Q(-1) through Q(+2) for ADTA(-1, +2), Q(-4) through Q(-1) for ADTA(-4, -1), or Q(-1) 
and Q(0) for ADTA(-1, 0), scaled by lagged total assets; DL = average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(-24, -18) through M(+18, 
+24);  DC = changes in the percentile rank of the number of press releases in M(-6, 0) from M(-12, -6); OCF = operating cash flows over the period Q(-1) through Q(+2) for a 
dependent variable ADTA(-1, +2), Q(-4) through Q(-1) for ADTA(-4, -1), or Q(-1) and Q(0) for ADTA (-1, 0), scaled by lagged total assets; CROA = changes in annualized 
ROA, measured as income before extraordinary items summed over Q(+3) to Q(+6) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(+3) – income before extraordinary items 
summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1); SIZE = log of the market value of equity at Q(-1); LEV = debt-to-equity ratio, the proxy for the 
closeness to violations of lending contracts; NONB6 = one if the firm’s auditor is not one of big six accounting firms, and zero otherwise; ABSTACC is the absolute value of 
total accruals over the period Q(-1) through Q(+2) for a dependent variable ADTA(-1, +2), Q(-4) through Q(-1) for ADTA(-4, -1), or Q(-1) and Q(0) for ADTA (-1, 0), 
scaled by lagged total assets; Tobin’s q = Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) measure of Tobin’s Q and calculated as {[Market value of common stock + Book value of preferred 
stock + Book value of long-term debt + Book value of current liabilities – (Book value of current assets – Book value of Inventories)] / Book value of total assets} in the last 
fiscal year ending before the SEO announcement; PPE_V = gross property, plant, and equipment divided by the market value of equity plus the book value of debt in the last 
fiscal year ending before the SEO announcement; RDint = research and development expense divided by net sales in the last fiscal year ending before the SEO 
announcement; INSTI = percentage ownership of institutional investors; BLOCK = percentage ownership of blockholders; INSIDER = percentage ownership of insiders; 
A_WD = number of asset writedown disclosures over M(-24, -18) through M(+18, +24); DIV = number of dividend change disclosures over M(-24, -18) through M(+18, 
+24); and ACQ = number of acquisition events over M(-24, -18) through M(+18, +24). ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in two-sided 
significance tests, respectively; t-values are in parentheses. 
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Independent Dependent variable = ADTA(-1, +2)  = ADTA(-4, -1) = ADTA(-1, 0)
variables Model (1)  Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
Intercept -0.0107  0.0229 0.0029 0.0291  -0.0322 -0.0052
 (-0.28)  (0.72) (0.08) (0.95)  (-0.84) (-0.24)
DL -0.1171  -0.1080 -0.1062 -0.0986  -0.0793 -0.0652
 (-3.33) *** (-3.22) *** (-3.13) *** (-3.05) *** (-2.00) ** (-2.75) ***
DC 0.0131  0.0343 0.0152 0.0343  -0.0265 0.0159
 (0.32)  (0.91) (0.38) (0.94)  (-0.59) (0.60)
OCF -0.2211  -0.2166 -0.2168 -0.2162  -0.2269 -0.5160
 (-6.35) *** (-6.59) *** (-6.44) *** (-6.80) *** (-4.58) *** (-11.62) ***
CROA -0.1136  -0.1258 -0.1084 -0.1223  -0.1874 -0.1658
 (-2.47) ** (-2.86) *** (-2.43) ** (-2.87) ** (-3.74) *** (-5.42) ***
SIZE 0.0171  0.0095 0.0144 0.0087  0.0092 0.0076
 (2.52) *** (1.68) * (2.19) ** (1.59)  (1.31) (1.90) *
LEV -0.0003  0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001  0.0001 -0.0002
 (-0.20)  (0.12) (-0.21) (0.11)  (0.17) (-0.92)
NONB6 0.0330  0.0238 0.0419 0.0330  0.0104 0.0360
 (1.06)  (0.83) (1.38) (1.17)  (0.28) (1.74) *
ABSTACC 0.5183  0.8133 0.5452 0.8339  -0.7334 -0.6620
 (0.71)  (1.12) (0.77) (1.19)  (-0.81) (-0.77)
Tobin’s q -0.0001  0.0002 0.0001 0.0001  0.0090 0.0021
 (-0.02)  (0.09) (0.01) (0.07)  (3.05) *** (0.85)
PPE V -0.0156  -0.0204 -0.0211 -0.0248  0.0290 0.0085
 (-0.87)  (-1.25) (-1.23) (-1.58)  (1.62) (0.73)
RDint -0.0011  -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0012  -0.0002 -0.0006
 (-2.53) ** (-2.53) ** (-2.71) *** (-2.71) *** (-0.27) (-1.99) **
INSTI -0.0900  -0.0634   
 (-2.21) ** (-1.60)   
BLOCK 0.0241  0.0099   
 (0.82)  (0.35)   
INSIDER 0.0803  0.0871   
 (1.99) ** (2.21) **   
A WD   -0.0283 -0.0257  -0.0341 -0.0193
   (-1.71) * (-1.58)  (-1.83) * (-1.61)
DIV   0.0031 0.0100  0.0021 0.0011
   (0.31) (1.02)  (0.17) (0.16)
ACQ   -0.0056 -0.0047  -0.0005 -0.0055
   (-1.82) * (-1.64) * (-0.14) (-2.63) ***
Number of observations 405  464 405 464 352 464
Adjusted 2R  15.13%  12.42% 16.00% 14.00% 9.51% 24.46%
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Table 6 
Regression results of one-year post-issue returns on disclosure frequency, earnings management, and other control variables 
 
The following equation is estimated: 
 
    AR1Y = a + b1 ADTA + b2 DL + b3 DC + b4 ADTA*DL + b5 ADTA*DC + b6 ADTA*SIZE + b7 ADTA*ROA  
                  + b8 ADTA*CROA + b9 SIZE + b10 ROA + b11 CROA + b12 BM 
 
where AR1Y = market-adjusted returns using the returns on the CRSP value-weighted market index as market returns, with returns compounded daily over the one-year period 
after the Q(+2) earnings announcement; ADTA = performance-adjusted discretionary total accruals over the period Q(-1) through Q(+2) for ADTA(-1, +2), Q(-4) through Q(-
1) for ADTA(-4, -1), or Q(-1) and Q(0) for ADTA(-1, 0), scaled by lagged total assets;  DL = average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over 
M(-24, -18) through M(+18, +24); DC = changes in the percentile rank of the number of press releases in M(-6, 0) from M(-12, -6); SIZE = log of the market value of equity at 
Q(-1); ROA = annualized ROA measured as income before extraordinary items summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1); CROA = changes in 
annualized ROA measured as income before extraordinary items summed over Q(+3) to Q(+6) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(+3) - income before extraordinary items 
summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1); and BM = book-to-market ratio at Q(-1). ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels in two-sided significance tests, respectively; t-values are in parentheses. 
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 Dependent variable = AR1Y 
Independent ADTA = ADTA(-1, +2)  = ADTA(-4, -1) = ADTA(-1, 0) 
variables Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  
Intercept -0.1479  -0.1919  -0.1554  -0.0530  -0.1644  
 (-1.72) * (-2.22) ** (-1.79) * (-0.50) * (-1.92) * 
ADTA -0.2978   -0.8112  -0.8637  -0.8884  
 (-2.96) ***  (-2.27) ** (-1.92) * (-1.82) * 
DL   0.2012  0.2254  0.2620  0.2143  
   (1.96) ** (2.15) ** (2.02) ** (2.09) ** 
DC    0.0181  -0.0502  0.0530  
    (0.16)  (-0.36)  (0.47)  
ADTA*DL    -0.6659  -0.8414  -1.0358  
    (-1.29)  (-1.23)  (-1.25)  
ADTA*DC    0.8050  0.7014  1.1016  
    (1.79) * (0.88)  (1.72) * 
ADTA*SIZE    0.1622  0.1987  0.2100  
    (2.19) ** (1.95) * (2.12) ** 
ADTA*ROA    -0.6367  -0.9448  -1.1072  
    (-1.68) * (-2.51) ** (-3.36) *** 
ADTA*CROA    -0.8605  -1.2365  -1.7943  
    (-1.84) * (-2.39) ** (-3.76) *** 
SIZE 0.0015  -0.0100  -0.0178  -0.0364  -0.0156  
 (0.10)  (-0.61)  (-1.10)  (-1.84) * (-0.98)  
ROA 0.2935  0.3574  0.3661  0.3566  0.5101  
 (2.98) *** (3.56) *** (3.47) *** (2.73) *** (4.64) *** 
CROA 0.7122  0.7376  0.8187  0.7973  0.9363  
 (5.18) *** (5.32) *** (5.71) *** (4.66) *** (6.41) *** 
BM 0.0715  0.0714  0.0707  0.0418  0.0614  
 (1.23)  (1.23)  (1.22)  (0.57)  (1.07)  
       
Number of observations 616  616  616  485  616  
Adjusted 2R  5.15%  4.38%  5.98%  5.22%  7.31%  
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Table 7 
Disclosure strategy, earnings management, and post-issue returns 
 
Panel A presents the results of the association between earnings management and different disclosure strategies and Panel B presents the effects of different disclosure strategies 
on post-issue returns. ADTA = performance-adjusted discretionary total accruals over the period Q(-1) through Q(+2) for ADTA(-1, +2), Q(-4) through Q(-1) for ADTA(-4, -
1), or Q(-1) and Q(0) for ADTA(-1, 0), scaled by lagged total assets; D1 = one if the average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(-24, -
18) through M(-6, 0) is in the top third and the average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(+6, +12) through M(+18, +24) is in the top 
third as well, and zero otherwise; D2 = one if the percentile rank of the number of press releases of M(-6, 0) is greater than the average percentile rank of the number of press 
releases per six-month period over M(-24, -18) through M(-12, -6) and greater than the average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(+12, 
+18) and M(+18, +24), and zero otherwise; D3 = one if the average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(-24, -18) through M(-6, 0) is in 
the bottom third and the average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(+6, +12) through M(+18, +24) is in the bottom third as well, and 
zero otherwise; OCF = operating cash flows over the period Q(-1) through Q(+2) for a dependent variable ADTA(-1, +2), Q(-4) through Q(-1) for ADTA(-4, -1), or Q(-1) 
and Q(0) for ADTA (-1, 0), scaled by lagged total assets; CROA = changes in annualized ROA measured as income before extraordinary items summed over Q(+3) to Q(+6) 
and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(+3) – income before extraordinary items summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1); SIZE = log of the 
market value of equity at Q(-1); LEV = debt-to-equity ratio, the proxy for the closeness to violations of lending contracts; NONB6 = one if the firm’s auditor is not one of big six 
accounting firms, and zero otherwise; ABSTACC is the absolute value of total accruals over the period Q(-1) through Q(+2) for a dependent variable ADTA(-1, +2), Q(-4) 
through Q(-1) for ADTA(-4, -1), or Q(-1) and Q(0) for ADTA (-1, 0), scaled by lagged total assets; Tobin’s q = Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) measure of Tobin’s Q and calculated 
as {[Market value of common stock + Book value of preferred stock + Book value of long-term debt + Book value of current liabilities – (Book value of current assets – Book 
value of Inventories)] / Book value of total assets} in the last fiscal year ending before the SEO announcement; PPE_V = gross property, plant, and equipment divided by the 
market value of equity plus book value of debt in the last fiscal year ending before the SEO announcement; RDint = research and development expense divided by net sales in the 
last fiscal year ending before the SEO announcement; A_WD = number of asset writedown disclosures over M(-24, -18) through M(+18, +24); DIV = number of dividend change 
disclosures over M(-24, -18) through M(+18, +24);  ACQ = number of acquisition events over M(-24, -18) through M(+18, +24); AR1Y = market-adjusted returns using the 
returns on the CRSP value-weighted market index as market returns, with returns compounded daily over the one-year period after the Q(+2) earnings announcement; ROA = 
annualized ROA measured as income before extraordinary items summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1);  and BM = book-to-market ratio at 
Q(-1). ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in two-sided significance tests, respectively; t-values are in parentheses. 
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Panel A: Disclosure strategy and earnings management 
 
 Dependent variable = ADTA(-1, +2) = ADTA(-4, -1) = ADTA(-1, 0)
Independent variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Intercept -0.0659 -0.0605 -0.0521 0.0041
 (-1.74) * (-1.59) (-1.27)  (0.14)
D1 -0.0386 -0.0384 -0.0443 -0.0299
 (-2.01) ** (-1.99) ** (-2.18) ** (-1.91) *
D2 0.0362 0.0345 -0.0057 0.0249
 (2.13) ** (2.03) ** (-0.29)  (1.73) *
D3 0.0429 0.0444 -0.0015 0.0096
 (1.80) * (1.87) * (-0.05)  (0.43)
OCF -0.2329 -0.2358 -0.2656 -0.5339
 (-6.36) *** (-6.42) *** (-5.87) *** (-9.41) ***
CROA -0.1619 -0.1637 -0.1949 -0.1705
 (-3.37) *** (-3.40) *** (-3.83) *** (-4.28) ***
SIZE 0.0096 0.0087 0.0091 -0.0010
 (1.52)  (1.38) (1.32)  (-0.19)
LEV 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.24) (-0.58)
NONB6 0.0406 0.0515 0.0304 0.0525
 (1.52) (1.59) (0.81) (1.95) **
ABSTACC -0.1095 -0.1595 -1.9056 -1.8417
 (-0.14) (-0.20) (-3.23) *** (-1.79) *
Tobin’s q 0.0025 0.0025 0.0113 0.0047
(0.96) (0.96) (4.37) *** (1.55)
PPE V 0.0189 0.0168 0.0316 0.0215
(1.09) (0.97) (1.67) * (1.46)
RDint -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0007
(-1.75) * (-1.76) * (-0.48)  (-1.65) *
A WD  -0.0235 -0.0335 -0.0180
  (-1.22) (-1.70) * (-1.10)
DIV  0.0154 0.0025 0.0018
 (1.34) (0.19) (0.19)
ACQ  -0.0036 -0.0007 -0.0063
  (-1.07) (-0.18)  (-2.19) **
     
Number of observations 464  464 352  464
Adjusted 2R  9.31% 
 
9.64%
 
12.00% 
 
17.03%
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Panel B: Disclosure strategy and post-issue returns 
 
 Dependent variable = AR1Y 
 ADTA = ADTA(-1, +2)  = ADTA(-4, -1)  = ADTA(-1, 0) 
Independent variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Intercept -0.0780  -0.0655  0.0209  -0.0684  
 (-0.86)  (-0.72)  (0.19)  (-0.75)  
D1 0.1250  0.1238  0.1211  0.0972  
 (2.48) ** (2.45) ** (2.01) ** (1.97) ** 
D2 -0.0854  -0.0897  -0.0949  -0.0816  
 (-1.94) * (-2.04) ** (-1.66) * (-1.74) * 
D3 0.0244  0.0100  0.1089  0.0369  
 (0.38)  (0.15)  (1.26)  (0.50)  
ADTA -0.2649  -0.6443  -1.2232  -0.8365  
 (-2.32) ** (-1.66) * (-2.33) ** (-2.13) ** 
ADTA*SIZE   0.0766  0.1717  0.1123  
   (1.07)  (1.84) * (1.47)  
ADTA*ROA   -0.6128  -1.2551  -0.9421  
   (-1.34)  (-2.73) *** (-2.97) *** 
ADTA*CROA   -1.2013  -1.8421  -1.8275  
   (-2.07) ** (-2.81) *** (-3.92) *** 
SIZE -0.0140  -0.0156  -0.0303  -0.0152  
 (-0.91)  (-1.01)  (-1.65) * (-0.96)  
ROA 0.3263  0.3575  0.3862  0.4903  
 (3.22) *** (3.42) *** (2.83) *** (4.47) *** 
CROA 0.7242  0.8089  0.8600  0.9312  
 (5.22) *** (5.66) *** (4.89) *** (6.40) *** 
BM 0.0625  0.0705  0.0005  0.0512  
 (1.07)  (1.21)  (0.01)  (0.88)  
       
Number of observations 616  616  485  616  
Adjusted 2R  5.56%  6.03%  6.69%  7.68%  
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Fig. 1. Timeline of seasoned equity offerings.  Q(.) represents the quarters around a SEO.  The quarter of the last earnings announcement before the offering 
announcement is labeled Q(-1).  Q(0) is the quarter of the first earnings announcement after the offering announcement.  All other quarters are similarly 
indexed relative to the offering announcement.  M(.) is the six-month period in which disclosure frequencies are determined.   M(-6, 0) is the last six-month 
period prior to the SEO announcement, and M(0, +6) is the first six-month period after the SEO announcement.  All other six-month periods are similarly 
indexed relative to the offering announcement.  Eann stands for earnings announcement. We measure post-issue returns by compounding daily market-
adjusted returns over the one-year period after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. The figure also illustrates important event dates and periods around SEO. 
The 1933 Securities Act prohibits any “offer to sell” prior to the filing of the registration statement before the file of the offer.  It also prohibits any sales 
prior to the effective date.  The period between the date of file and the effective date is “Waiting Period.”  The average Waiting Period in Rangan (1998) is 
35 days.  In our sample the average Waiting Period is 49 days and the median is 35 days.  Lock-up agreements between issuing firms and their underwriters 
prevent insiders at issuing firms from selling their holdings until 90 to 180 days after the offering date. 
 
 
